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[Below is a textual reproduction of the first part of the US State Department's 1992 Human Rights
report on Peru, released in January in Lima. Although the LADB does not generally reproduce
government documents, we feel that the detailed information contained in the report would be
of service to our readers. The remainder of the report will be published in the 02/16/93 edition of
NotiSur.] Twelve years of democratic government in Peru were interrupted on April 5, 1992, when
President Fujimori dissolved Congress, reorganized the judiciary, and suspended portions of the
1979 Constitution. Supported by the military and the majority of public opinion, the President
said the old political system was incapable of fighting terrorism, corruption, and economic decay.
Following international condemnation of his actions at a special meeting of the Foreign Ministers of
the Organization of American States (OAS) on May 18, President Fujimori agreed to hold elections
for a Constituent Congress, which took place on November 22. The Constituent Congress will
legislate until July 1995 and draft a new constitution. Although the two largest political parties
boycotted the elections, observers, including those from the OAS, found them to have been
conducted fairly. A return to democratic institutions, however, will depend upon the degree of
autonomy of the new Congress and the judiciary, as well as the conduct of the 1993 municipal
elections and the entry into force of a new constitution. An attempted coup in November further
underscored the need for a return to full democracy. The judicial system, which had suffered from
corruption and political influence, was placed under executive branch control after April 5. Ruling
by decree law, President Fujimori made major changes in judicial and prosecutorial procedures
and personnel. Numerous judges and prosecutors were fired for corruption in an effort to address
deficiencies in the civilian courts. New decree laws defined most terrorism cases as "treason"
to be tried in military courts. This led to concern that the military courts, which so far have an
almost 100 percent conviction rate under the new rules, will not try defendants fairly. Other laws
restrict the actions of defense attorneys in terrorism trials and increase penalties for terrorism.
Prosecutions of alleged government abuses made little significant progress during 1992. Public
security responsibilities are shared by the police and the military. According to the US Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency, total military expenditures for 1989 were approximately $500 million.
There are no plans to reduce current military expenditures in the near future. The military and the
police continued to share counterterrorism duties in Lima; in the countryside, the military takes
the lead in areas under a state of emergency. Emergency zone status continued to provide for the
suspension of certain constitutional guarantees; currently 48 percent of Peru's 22 million people
live in such areas, including the 8 million residents of Lima. A vast majority of Peruvians consider
the terrorist activities of the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) Maoist guerrillas to be the country's
major threat. Both the police and military continued to be responsible for human rights abuses in
1992. Peru has a mixed economy which combines free market capitalism with state ownership of
some major industries. Minerals extraction and processing account for half of the foreign exchange
earnings. President Fujimori's administration pursued a rigorous economic stabilization and
structural adjustment program in an attempt to reverse decades of economic decline. An important
step in this program was the privatization of state-owned firms. Recession continues, however,
and it is estimated that at least one third of Peruvians live in critical poverty. The chief sources of
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human rights violations in Peru remained the terrorist activities of the Sendero Luminoso and, to
a lesser degree, the excesses of the security services. Sendero abuses included assassinations of
perceived opponents or the merely uncooperative, from government leaders and other officials to
religious workers and peasants. Sendero, lacking popular support, makes terror against civilians
an integral part of its strategy. In the countryside, Sendero killed members of rural self-defense
forces (rondas), community leaders, and political party members. On October 10, Sendero killed
48 peasants in the Ayacucho village of Huayllao; it was the largest single massacre by guerrillas
in the last 8 years. To create a power vacuum in which it could grow in Lima, Sendero murdered
scores of grassroots leaders during 1992, including Maria Elena Moyano, who advocated peaceful
opposition to Sendero. She was shot dead and her body blown to pieces by dynamite in front of
her children on February 15. Sendero's other weapon in Lima was the use of powerful car bombs
in populated areas. Peru's respected, independent National Coordinating Committee for Human
Rights (Coordinadora) reported that Sendero was responsible for 654 assassinations as of November
1992. On September 12 counterterrorism police captured Sendero chief Abimael Guzman and other
top Sendero leaders. They were found guilty in military trials and sentenced to life imprisonment.
This was a considerable blow to Sendero, although the organization remained a serious threat to
Peruvian institutions, and Sendero bombings and abuses continued. Other police and military
actions in 1992 severely hurt the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA). Both Sendero and
MRTA continued to vie for control of parts of Peru's major coca-growing region, the Upper Huallaga
valley. In 1992 there continued to be credible reports of summary executions, disappearances,
arbitrary detentions, torture, and rape by the military and police. Most of these abuses occurred in
rural emergency zones. Particularly in the Huancayo area, the military and police appear to have
selectively kidnaped and killed dozens of persons alleged to be members of Sendero Luminoso. Few
abuses are fully investigated, and prosecution of security force members is rare. Statistics from the
Coordinadora and the Public Ministry (an autonomous office of the Attorney General) confirmed
that the number of disappearances and extrajudicial killings by the security forces remained roughly
the same as in 1991. Members of the security forces, rondas, and paramilitary groups possibly
connected to elements within the Government were believed responsible for 95 extrajudicial
killings. President Fujimori continued in 1992 to stress publicly the need to improve respect for
human rights, including by the security forces. However, he continued to criticize strongly local
and international human rights groups as apologists for terrorists. There were credible reports that
the Government used the courts on several occasions to intimidate political opponents and human
rights activists. Military and police investigations into human rights violations committed by their
own members were sporadic and rarely resulted in effective criminal prosecutions. While security
forces claimed that there were significant numbers of dismissals for various types of abuses, these
were difficult to verify since military practice is to seal the relevant records. RESPECT FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: a. Political
and Other Extrajudicial Killing The Coordinadora estimated that Sendero Luminoso committed
654 political assassinations through November 1992; the MRTA 15; and unidentified subversives
54. The security forces were responsible for 81 extrajudicial killings through November 1992;
paramilitary groups for 10; and peasant rondas, often associated with the military, for 4. The deaths
of 170 persons were classified as "not clarified." Due to the isolation of many rural areas where
Sendero is most active, the number of victims is probably underreported. According to the dissolved
Congress' Commission on Pacification, 2,830 people, including combatants and civilians, were killed
in overall terrorist-related violence between January and November 1992. This figure includes 1,040
terrorists and 427 soldiers and police. Armed clashes with government forces accounted for the
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bulk of casualties among terrorists. It is often difficult to distinguish combat-related deaths from
extrajudicial killings, which makes charges of human rights abuse difficult to verify. Of the reported
81 extrajudicial killings attributed by the Coordinadora to police and military forces as of November
1992, the majority occurred in emergency zones. For example, between August and October, armed
and masked persons abducted 30 students from the Peruvian Central University in Huancayo.
Eleven were found dead bearing burns and signs of electric shocks. Human rights monitors blame
the military for these deaths. In San Martin, Eric Rojas Llanca, 16, and Rafael Navarro Pisango, 20,
were detained by the armed forces on June 21. On June 22, their bodies, bearing signs of torture,
were found in a nearby river. The number of extrajudicial killings was likely underreported, given
widespread distrust of the State by the community at large and the dysfunctional Peruvian justice
system. The security forces have generally been unable or unwilling to investigate and prosecute
cases in which their own members are implicated. The Peruvian Code of Military Justice contains
no provision for dealing with cases of killing, kidnaping, or torture, only "negligence" and "abuse
of authority." Although the current Code allows military courts to use relevant portions of the
Civilian Penal Code to try crimes not covered under the Military Code, this is rarely done. The
military has repeatedly used its court system to preempt civilian investigation and prosecution
of cases involving military abuses; under the law, persons tried under a military court cannot
subsequently be tried in civilian courts for the same offense. In September 1991, the Government
authorized access by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to all military detention
facilities to verify the presence and welfare of detainees. This access continued until September
1992, when the Government informed the ICRC that new laws restricted previously agreed-upon
ICRC access to civilian prisons. The ICRC halted its prison visits in September but continued to
visit police and military installations. At year's end, the ICRC and the Government were working
to resolve the problem. In 1992 the ICRC registered over 2,200 new security detainees at various
places of detention throughout the country. The ICRC visited some 130 police stations, including
the counter-terrorism police offices in Lima, and registered over 1,100 new detainees, of whom
over 300 were later released by the authorities after investigation. Over 135 military facilities were
visited and about 120 new detainees were registered, of whom approximately 40 were released after
investigation. During May 4-9, the national police stormed Lima's Canto Grande maximum security
prison, which housed the majority of the country's convicted terrorists. Sendero and MRTA inmates
had gained control of their respective cell blocks, and Sendero propaganda proclaimed the prisons
to be "shining trenches of combat" that Sendero used as training centers for its cadre. Police initially
showed restraint, despite the deaths of two policemen, one of whom was reportedly killed with acid.
After a final police assault, official and unofficial casualty reports indicated that at least 36 inmates
had been killed. There are credible reports that the police deliberately killed four Sendero leaders,
and perhaps others, after effective control of the prison was reestablished. After the assault, human
rights organizations and the ICRC were denied access to the prison. Human rights groups maintain
that an unknown number of captured terrorists and innocent civilians were summarily executed by
the military in 1992. These claims are difficult or impossible to verify due to difficulties in obtaining
information or traveling to many of these areas. In 1992 President Fujimori pointed to the rondas
as a fundamental part of his antisubversive strategy against Sendero Luminoso. Some rondas are
organized and equipped by the Government and the military. Many, however, emerge and operate
with little government encouragement; they are often the only defense a community has against
terrorists. The rondas have demonstrated some effectiveness in deterring bandits and terrorists,
as well as serving other functions such as basic community self-help work. Reports indicated,
however, that some rondas were involved in numerous human rights abuses, including the torture
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and extrajudicial killing of suspected terrorists. No progress was reported in the investigation
into the November 3, 1991, massacre of 17 persons in the Barrios Altos neighborhood of Lima.
Despite strong indications that the authors of this massacre may have been linked to the security
forces, the Government publicly insisted the assailants could have been common criminals, and the
investigation stalled. An article based on supposed army sources that claimed a special intelligence
service unit carried out the killings, with apparent government approval, was not investigated.
Instead, the Government sued the journalist for libel. There was little progress in the Santa Barbara
(Huancavelica department) case where an army officer and five noncommissioned officers were
charged in the July 4, 1991, deaths of 14 peasants whose bodies were found in an abandoned mine.
The trial of 14 cashiered police personnel implicated in the June 23, 1991, deaths of a medical student
and two teenaged brothers in Callao entered its last legal stages and is expected to be concluded
in early 1993. The investigating prosecutor in the March 15 letter bomb attack on human rights
lawyer Dr. Augusto Zuniga Paz suspended action on the case April 27 pending further evidence.
Dr. Zuniga's representatives were reportedly unaware of this until September and filed another suit
in this case. As in 1991, military officials asserted that a number of enlisted men and officers were
prosecuted in the military justice system on charges relating to human rights violations. However,
such assertions were difficult to confirm because, as a matter of practice, the military courts sealed
relevant records. Neither the identities of these individuals, the nature of their offenses, nor the
exact sentences imposed were made public. Sendero Luminoso continued to assassinate teachers,
clergy, engineers, development and human rights workers, political activists, and public servants,
as well as members of the security forces. In 1992 Sendero stepped up violent political activity
in urban centers, with particular emphasis on Lima's surrounding slum areas, killing over 145
grassroots leaders. A number of these killings were carried out in a gruesome fashion intended
to intimidate other potential opponents. On February 15 a Sendero assassination team shot and
killed Maria Elena Moyano, a leader in Lima's Villa El Salvador shantytown, in the presence of her
children, then blew up her body by exploding dynamite placed on her chest. Sendero continued to
target foreign religious and development workers. On October 2, a Sendero unit kidnaped Italian
Salesian Brother Giuliani Rocca from his order's house near Huaraz, Ancash department and
later killed him with a shot to the head. On October 10, a Sendero column attacked the hamlet of
Huayllao, in Ayacucho department, murdering at least 48 villagers, including the elderly, women,
and children, and sacking or burning a large portion of the community. A second terrorist group, the
MRTA, carried out sporadic high visibility/low risk actions, such as the July 6 4-hour raid on Jaen,
Cajamarca department; the August ambush of an army truck in Lima, in which five soldiers and
one civilian died; and a series of ineffective mortar attacks in mid-October against the Presidential
Palace, the U.S. Ambassador's residence and the Ministry of the Army. This group suffered serious
setbacks, however, including capture and incarceration of senior MRTA leaders. b. Disappearance
The number of disappearance cases in 1992 remained roughly the same as in 1991. The Public
Ministry reported 145 new unresolved disappearance cases as of November 1992. The Coordinadora,
using different case tracking methods, reported 171 at that time. These numbers are likely to
increase as reports of disappearances that occurred late in 1992 continue to be recorded. Senator
Enrique Bernales, former chairman of the respected Senate Commission on Violence, reported
that in 1992 there were 280 disappearances, as compared to 300 in 1991. According to the Public
Ministry, the majority of its formal disappearance complaints implicated members of the security
forces in the emergency zones. Most new cases were reported in San Martin, Junin, and Ayacucho
departments. However, the number of cases reported in metropolitan Lima increased dramatically,
from some 3 percent of all cases in 1991 to about 15 percent in 1992. Testimony from survivors
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indicates that most victims are taken to military bases for interrogation. Some of those held are
eventually turned over to the civilian court system to be released due to lack of evidence or to be
imprisoned on terrorism charges; others never reappear. The rondas figured increasingly in the
number of reported disappearances. Rondas were alleged to have been involved in approximately
3 percent of disappearance cases in 1991 and 13 percent in 1992. Combined military/ronda patrols
were implicated in another 10 percent of disappearance cases in 1992. On July 18, professor Hugo
Munoz Sanchez and nine students were reportedly detained by the armed forces during a sweep
of dormitories at La Cantuta Teachers' College. The military denied the detentions, but to date the
students have not been seen; writs of habeas corpus were ignored. (The armed forces occupied
La Cantuta in 1991 to counter pervasive Sendero Luminoso influence on the campus.) At 2 a.m.
June 24, unidentified armed and uniformed army personnel reportedly broke into the home of
journalist Pedro Yauri Bustamante in Huacho, Lima department. The men bound and gagged
Yauri and his father, beat them, and drove away with Yauri in a pickup truck. He was not seen
subsequently. The Huacho police refused to let Yauri's father file a complaint, and the court in
Huacho denied a writ of habeas corpus. In May charges of illegal detention and abuse of authority
were filed against five policemen in the disappearance case of Manuel Pacotaype, mayor of Chuschi
in Ayacucho department, and three other men. The victims disappeared on March 14, 1991, and
were never seen again. An unknown number of "disappeared" persons may be unaccounted for
because they joined the ranks of the MRTA or Sendero, either voluntarily or under duress. It is
believed that the number of persons forcibly recruited by Sendero is underreported. c. Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment Although the Constitution
prohibits torture and inhuman or humiliating treatment, charges of brutal treatment of detainees
are common. Knowledgeable observers reported that suspected subversives held by government
security forces were routinely tortured at military detention centers. Four army officers detained
for coup plotting made credible claims that they had been tortured by beatings, electric shocks,
and being hung up by their wrists with their arms tied behind their backs. In 1992 there were also
reliable accounts from released detainees of torture or mistreatment by the police. There continued
to be credible reports of rape perpetrated by elements of the security forces in the emergency
zones. In one case, an army lieutenant and six soldiers raped 14-year-old Froyli Mori Vela after
searching the house in which she and her parents were staying. When torture occurs it often takes
place in the period immediately following detention. The law requires that persons detained
for terrorism be interrogated in the presence of a Public Ministry prosecutor. Reliable reports of
violations of these standards are frequent, especially in the emergency zones. The requirement
that an attorney be present at the initial stages of detention and interrogation in treason cases was
eliminated by decree law in 1992. Many victims of Sendero terrorism also show signs of having
been tortured. Torture of those victims often follows a brief "people's trial," normally held in the
presence of villagers as intimidation. There are credible accounts that Sendero tortures victims
to death by means such as slitting throats, strangulation, stoning, and burning. Mutilation of the
body is common. Peruvian prison conditions are appalling. Prisoners are exposed to unsanitary
facilities, poor nutrition and health care, as well as to harsh treatment by both prison staff and fellow
prisoners. Corruption is rampant among prison staff, who have been implicated in a multitude
of offenses, from sexual blackmail and the selling of narcotics and weapons to arranging prison
escapes. There were credible reports of routine beatings and torture of inmates by prison guards.
Besides beatings, common methods of torture reportedly include electric shocks to sensitive areas
of the body, water torture, asphyxiation, and being hung on a hook from a rope attached to hands
tied behind the back. Human rights groups reported that in June two Senderista inmates died
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of exposure at the maximum security prison in Puno following their transfer to that facility after
police regained control of Lima's Canto Grande prison in May. d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention,
or Exile The Constitution, the Penal Code, and antiterrorist legislation delineate the arrest and
detention process. However, most if not all of these protections are suspended in practice in those
areas under a state of emergency. In areas not subject to a state of emergency, a judicial warrant
is required for arrest, unless a perpetrator is caught in the act. Persons arrested must be arraigned
within 24 hours, except in cases of terrorism, drug trafficking, or espionage, for which the limit is 15
days. Suspected terrorists charged under new 1992 treason decrees may be held for up to 30 days
before arraignment. Detainees (in nonemergency zone areas) have the right to choose their own
attorney, or the Government must provide counsel at no cost. This does not always occur in practice,
and human rights sources report instances where court clerks have been deputized to stand in as
counsel. There is no functioning bail system; a form of provisional liberty is available for persons
not accused of terrorism, espionage, or narcotics offenses. A provisional registry of detainees held
by both the military and police for terrorism and other security crimes began operating in 1992.
Police detention centers do not make publicly available information detailing detentions, charges,
transfers, or releases of detainees. The ICRC, however, has access to local police detention records
and to the national military registry of detainees. Local human rights organizations are expected to
have access to the national registry of detainees in military and police facilities through the Office
of the National Fiscal for Human Rights. Arrest procedures are different in the emergency zones.
Security forces do not need an arrest warrant, and detainees are often denied access to an attorney
during interrogation and to family members during their imprisonment. All detainees, including
those in the emergency zones, have the legal right to seek judicial determination of the legality
of their detention, but this right is often disregarded by military commanders in the emergency
zones. Of the detainees held by the military inside the emergency zones, human rights groups
know of very few who were turned over to civilian authorities for prosecution. Incommunicado
detention of suspects was a common practice by government forces operating in the emergency
zones. Dozens of persons, whose detention the Government's security forces had initially denied,
nonetheless were later found to have been held in military detention centers. In mid-1991 the
Government issued a legislative decree granting civilian public prosecutors access to all military
barracks and detention centers, including those in the emergency zones. The decree specifies that
the prosecutor may privately interview a detainee immediately upon his detention and examine
him or her for signs of physical abuse. Where applicable, the prosecutor may order the prisoner
remanded into the civilian court system. If remanded to the courts, the prosecutor is to accompany
the prisoner and require a formal medical examination upon delivering him into civilian judicial
custody. A public prosecutor must be present at the release of any prisoner from military detention.
Throughout 1992 public prosecutors generally continued to have access to military installations
in the emergency zones, with sporadic problems. The provision for access to military installations
by the Public Ministry's human rights officials is relatively new and could reverse the status quo
whereby detainees are held incommunicado and possibly disappear. Nevertheless, the number
of detainees actually turned over to civilian authorities is believed to be small in comparison to
the number of persons thought to have actually been detained. At least 48 persons were detained
or placed under house arrest without charges following the events of April 5, including former
government ministers, parliamentarians, labor leaders and an estimated 24 journalists. The
Government permitted ICRC visits to most of the detainees, and most were released within 10
days. Only Agustin Mantilla, former Interior Minister in the Alan Garcia administration, remains
in detention. Government and security officials, as well as independent observers, believe that
©2011 The University of New Mexico,
Latin American & Iberian Institute.
All rights reserved.

Page 6 of 9

LADB Article Id: 058057
ISSN: 1060-4189

Mantilla was connected to the now defunct Commando Rodrigo Franco paramilitary group that
operated during the Garcia administration in the late 1980's. However, Mantilla's detention was
generally viewed as politically motivated. The Constitution prohibits forced involuntary exile, and
there have been no such cases in the past 10 years. e. Denial of Fair Public Trial The Peruvian legal
system is based generally on the Napoleonic Code. Defendants have the right to be present at the
trial, at which time verdicts are rendered by a judge or a panel of judges following an investigation
and the filing of charges. Sentences may be appealed, and judges may send cases back to lower
courts for additional investigation. Prior to April 5, the 28 Supreme Court judges were nominated by
the President (from slates supplied by an Advisory Committee) and approved by the Senate. After
the April 5 takeover, 14 Supreme Court judges were dismissed, and 3 others resigned in protest.
President Fujimori then appointed new judges to a new Supreme Court consisting of 18 members.
The Court of Constitutional Guarantees and the Advisory Committee mandated to nominate judges
were both disbanded. The President may replace and appoint judges and prosecutors; in practice,
the court system is not independent of the executive branch. In September a new decree created
a judicial career system, in which future entry-level judges will be chosen from the graduates of
the planned Academy of Higher Studies in the Ministry of Justice. Post-graduate academy training
will be a requirement for promotion throughout the judicial system, including the Supreme Court.
There continued to be widespread charges of corruption and of the suborning of judges, police, and
witnesses at all stages of the judicial process. Courts faced severe backlogs, a product of inefficiency,
archaic case law and criminal procedural law, and the sharp increase in terrorism cases. The case
backlog in the Supreme Court alone was 28,000. No one knows the size of the backlog for the entire
judicial system, but estimates range between 250,000 and 500,000 for all types of cases. Human
rights groups have documented hundreds of cases of persons who have been detained without
bail while awaiting trial for periods of up to 4 years or longer. President Fujimori continued his
program of phased release of unconvicted prison inmates awaiting trial, especially those who had
already been in custody for a time longer than the sentence for the crime with which they have been
charged. The vast majority of human rights complaints made to the public prosecutor's office during
the past 10 years were not investigated adequately due to lack of police and military cooperation,
resources, and official support. Provincial prosecutors attempting to investigate complaints in
the emergency zones were threatened, obstructed, and refused information by members of the
armed forces. Following a presidential decree in late 1991, access and support for human rights
prosecutors improved, but cooperation by the security forces with civilian prosecutor investigations
is still limited, and the prosecutors themselves often failed to conduct investigations aggressively.
Sendero and MRTA threats and intimidation of judges handling terrorism cases also account in
part for the low conviction rate of accused terrorists. Since 1981 only 571 people have been tried
and convicted for terrorism. According to the Public Ministry, this represents a conviction rate of
approximately 10 percent. The extremely low rate of conviction in terrorism cases contributes to
police/military frustration with the judicial process and to public tolerance of abuses committed
by security forces operating against presumed terrorists. Following the events of April 5, special
courts were created to try terrorism cases in which the identity of the judges would remain secret.
An August decree classified nearly any terrorist act as treason, subject to trial by military tribunal
with a maximum sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor. The civilian courts with secret judges
began operating in September, at the same time the military courts began to handle terrorism
cases. Human rights groups criticized these decrees and procedures as a denial of due process.
These groups reported that of over 70 cases expeditiously tried by military tribunals, all resulted in
guilty verdicts. Civilian "faceless judge" courts reportedly are affected by the same inefficiency and
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inability to process cases that plague the normal civilian judicial system. With most terrorism trials
now falling under military court jurisdiction, the proceedings became hidden from public scrutiny.
Decree laws were issued in 1992 designed to speed case processing and eliminate backlogs and
waiting periods in terrorism cases. After a 30-day initial detention and investigation period (twice
the 15-day maximum previously allowed), most cases appear to now fall under the jurisdiction of
military tribunals, which must pass judgment on the cases within 10 days. An appeal may be made
to the War Council, which has 10 days to decide on the appeal. A final appeal to the Supreme Court
of Military Justice would be acted upon within 5 days. New decrees restricted defense attorneys to
one active terrorism case each. On September 22, a special military tribunal sentenced Juan Carlos
Quispe and Edilberto Macalupu to life imprisonment for treason in the Sendero assassination of
police captain Carlos Verau. These legal proceedings took a record 20 days, reflecting still other
decree laws designed to speed up dramatically the legal processing of terrorism cases. On October
7, Sendero Luminoso founder Abimael Guzman was sentenced by secret military tribunal to life
imprisonment and assessed $25 billion plus interest in civil damages for "treason against the State."
Other senior Sendero leaders captured along with Guzman on September 12 were also sentenced
to life in prison under the new decrees. Defense lawyers complained that the trial procedures were
too abbreviated, that they were unable to cross-examine witnesses, and that President Fujimori
had in effect announced the verdict before the trial. Guzman's lawyer argued that Guzman was a
political prisoner not subject to criminal prosecution. However, Guzman publicly admitted that
he was the "president" of Sendero Luminoso and was responsible for what he termed Sendero's
"war" against the Peruvian State. Guzman showed no signs of physical mistreatment and was
allowed to address the press at length on one occasion. The nature of these trials secret, brief,
with little apparent time for the defense to act and limited ability to cross examine or impeach
witnesses combined with a system in which the military makes arrests, prosecutes, and passes
judgment raises serious questions about Peru's ability to ensure due process for persons who, unlike
Guzman, plead innocence. The new Supreme Court apparently will continue to decide whether
military and police offenders are tried in civilian courts or in the separate military court system.
The military generally asserts its jurisdiction in cases involving its personnel, and the Supreme
Court has generally ruled in its favor. Under Peruvian law, those tried in military courts may not
be retried for the same offense in civilian courts. f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family,
Home, or Correspondence The Constitution requires police to have a judicial warrant to enter a
private dwelling, and this requirement is generally respected. The requirement is suspended in
the emergency zones, however, and security forces in those areas routinely conduct searches of
private homes without warrants. With training and encouragement by the army, a number of rural
communities organized rondas to protect themselves against terrorist and bandit incursions. They
have had a noticeable impact on curbing Sendero's presence in certain areas of the country. In some
parts of the nation, rondas have existed for centuries as a form of social organization and to protect
residents from invaders and rustlers. In most cases, peasants joined rondas voluntarily to defend
against Sendero. However, many of the newer rondas were actively organized, and sometimes
imposed, under the direction of the military authorities, with peasants sometimes coerced into
participating in ronda activities. Credible reports indicate some rondas engage in or support illegal
activities, from cattle rustling to protection of the coca industry. Sendero is also credibly accused of
regularly forcing peasants to join its military ranks, often for extended periods, and coercing their
participation in terrorist attacks and executions.
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-- End --
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